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ne of the lessons especially of 
late antique philosophy is to 
look upon the bodily person one, 
in some sense, "is," as one thing, 
one animal among many others. Really to under-
stand that thing, that animal, the watchful intel-
lect needs to understand a world. This thing here, 
this human animal, is what it is in part because of 
things that happened, or did not happen, long 
before its life began, or it woke to be aware of it. 
So illuminating retrospectives must incorporate 
the story of a culture, nation, family. That is 
obvious to everyone when we deal with clearly 
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alien cases. Learning and historical imagina-
tion must be brought to bear on memoirs of 
Hellenistic Greek, or Mediaeval Florentine: 
to make their lives lucid, such as "we" could 
imagine living, we must go further than their 
lives. Contemporary English-speakers, if 
parochial enough, may easily and lazily 
suppose that any English-speaker is enough 
like others for a common background to be 
presupposed, and so neglect imagination and 
research. But contemporary, English-speaking 
culture is not homogenous; even British 
culture is not, let alone the "Western World," 
and weird misunderstandings of our differ-
ences abound: witness a recent American 
visitor who fondly supposed that all British 
academic couples have wonderful English 
nannies! All merely partial histories mislead, 
but who could write that history of the world, 
that universe after one peculiar mode, that is 
the world for this one animal? A true retro-
spective should begin: And There Was Light. 
Beginning - in deference to editorial 
whim - a little downstream from that singu-
lar event: my family rises on the borders of 
North Wales and England, as an eddy within 
the confluence of races and traditions that we 
label "Britain." My mother was the youngest 
daughter - by some eighteen years - of an 
early Labour Member of Parliament. His 
name (Samuel Finney), and provenance, 
suggest that there were Irish navvies in the 
background, brought in to build the railways, 
though family legend also speaks of gentry 
come down in the world. He was himself the 
last survivor of twenty-two children, had 
worked down in the mines, and chose in the 
end to be a union-leader rather than M.P. He 
was a fervent Methodist, taught himself 
Hebrew and Greek, kept abreast of modern 
developments in science and scholarship, and 
died ten years before I was born. One of my 
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earliest memories is of his widow, my grand-
mother, driving away from home to die in 
hospital. She had played a large part in my 
early life: "Finnies," the saying was, "be like 
cats: they waken up at night" - and demand 
company. My own children seem to be the 
same. My father had been an apprentice 
railway man, won a scholarship to Manch-
ester University, and was thereby set upon a 
career teaching engineering and running 
technical colleges. Mother and Father loved 
at first sight, romantically spotting each other 
in the country lane near Miss Finney's first 
{and last} teaching job. I was their youngest 
son by some ten years. The generations of my 
extended family are therefore as out of line as 
are their class-affiliations: I have first cousins 
well towards or even in retirement, and 
including grocers, lawyers, poets, town-clerks 
and a scientific knight. In my near family 
there are two brothers and their wives, four 
nephews and a niece; in my immediate, a 
wife, a son, two daughters and four cats. 
British society is at once more mobile and 
more conscious of class and regional affilia-
tion than some other segments of the Western 
world at least pretend to be. Our family loyal-
ties were with Labour, and I was raised on 
memories of the great betrayal, the miners left 
to fight alone in 1926. As a pupil at an inde-
pendent school (to which my parents, prod-
ucts of an earlier working-class devotion to 
learning, had sent me when we moved to 
Nottingham from Teesside), I was unusual in 
professing {ill-thought-out} socialist princi-
ples, but way back in the nineteen fifties and 
sixties it was fashionable to be anti-militarist 
and liberal-minded. My generation, deploring 
Suez, Hungary and the Cuban Missile crisis all 
alike, opted out of the Combined Cadet 
Corps in unprecedented numbers; my son's 
opts in. I was, or so I now see, an elderly and 
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unadventurous child who gradually chose the 
path of literary skill, scholarship and argu-
mentative technique as a way of surviving 
boyish hostility. Physically I was not so much 
cowardly as uncomprehending, not so much 
clumsy as inattentive. Perhaps I identified a 
little with our dog: a mongrel runt who appar-
ently believed herself to be a cat! By the time 
I left to go up to Balliol I had a few close 
thinking-companions, but none of my close 
friends now date from those school days. 
Having no sisters, and attending a single-sex 
school, I knew women only through my 
mother and my memories of earlier compan-
ions. A radical conversion back to Christiani-
ty just before going up confirmed in me the 
sort of dream that Jewish boys are said to have 
(or Jewish mothers on their sons' behalf!) that 
there was something that I had to do, some-
thing for which I should be ready, something 
incompatible with sixties sensualism. It was 
my second year at university before I quite 
abandoned that self-dedication and found 
that girls were more agreeable companions 
than dreams. The Jewish reference, by the 
way, was not irrelevant: my grandfuther had 
been attracted - though not, I think, finally 
deceived - by the creed of British Israel, the 
historical fantasy that the British were the 
heirs of the ten "lost tribes." The fantasy 
touched deep roots: the non-conformist lower 
classes earlier this century had a strong con-
viction that they were or had been "slaves in 
Egypt," that their salvation would be through 
their loyalty to the covenant. 
I have never worked harder than in those 
first two years at college: from being a recog-
nized, and slowly tolerated, swot and intellec-
tual I was transformed into a bright 
undergraduate in a university packed tight 
with them, and with products of a richer class 
than mine. Who could compete with students 
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whose families had been producing scholars 
and gentlemen for generations, and who had 
themselves been writing Latin verse (a useless 
but engaging pastime that does teach many 
vital rules of life) since their preparatory 
school? But Oxford University is a machine 
for remoulding youth into the image of such 
scholarship and sometime gentility. By the 
time I graduated I could even - more or less 
- cope with dining in All Souls, where I was 
elected Fellow in 1968. Even so, I deliberately 
rose late for the first year, so as not to have to 
share breakfast with the elite. 
I had graduated with a Double First in Lit-
terae Humaniores, and thought at first to con-
centrate on Classical scholarship, perhaps to 
write a thesis on Plato's debt to Pindar (negli-
gible), or on Blake's Metaphysics (a project 
from which my tutor, Arthur Prior, properly 
dissuaded me). In the event I wrote a maver-
ick thesis on Aristotle, grounding his ethics 
and political philosophy in his biological 
observations and theory. The shape it took 
owed something to my position outside usual 
post-graduate life (as a consequence of which 
I had no contact with the group of postgradu-
ates, including Rosalind and Stanley 
Godlovitch, who were then introdUcing 
Animal Liberation to the philosophical 
scene), and something to a year spent in 
Chicago, where I taught undergraduates, hid 
in a room in the Regenstein Library and occa-
sionally cleaned out the cockroaches from the 
kitchen of the apartment I shared with three 
graduate students. What I saw in Aristotle 
was the sense of humankind as one animal 
species among many, with distinctive powers 
that gave us, or some of us, the chance to 
mirror the world's being, to live from God as 
centre rather than our sorry selves. The thesis, 
published as Ariswtle's Man in 1975, had all 
the usual faults of unclarity and crammed 
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quotation, but identified - for those who 
understood it - how I thought it right to 
reason about what to do and think. 
I had gone to Chicago partly to get out of 
Oxford, partly to while away the time until 
the (Jewish!) girl I thought to marry should 
come back from a teaching job in Persia. A 
visit there had gone disastrously wrong; other 
- and highly unsuitable - relationships led 
nowhere (one Okinawan girl was hurriedly 
summoned home when her mother learnt of 
my existence). Soon after my return I married 
a scholar and research fellow of Somerville 
instead, herself a product of Liverpool Scot, 
Somerset and Southern Welsh: our wedding 
celebration was very nearly the last time that 
either of us ate dead animals with any plea-
sure. Our children now can hardly compre-
hend the fact that once we did. Our joint 
conversion came when we were staying at my 
parents' home in Suffolk: they had retired to 
country life when I went up to Oxford. The 
farm next door took calves in to be reared for 
beef: the noise of their complaints kept us 
awake at night, and we at last decided that we 
could no longer finance practices like that. 
In 1974 we moved to Glasgow University, 
where the lectures I had planned on issues 
related to the treatment of non-human 
animals took shape. Those lectures became 
The Maral SUltuS of Animals, published in 
1977 (and in slightly revised paperback in 
1982). I was astonished, and hurt, by the 
offence they caused: not hurt by any offence 
caused to the uncaring and unthinking, of 
course, but by the reactions of those who 
might have been thought allies. Apparently 
people could not see when I was joking, or 
when I was advancing a thesis only to change 
or controvert it by a necessary antithesis. 
Apparently my whole strategy was something 
that they could not recognize: the "right" way 
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of doing philosophy, I was patronizingly 
informed, was to layout demonstrative argu-
ments from necessarily acknowledged princi-
ples to incontrovertible judgements. I had 
sinned against the light by offering no single 
system within which to work, by suggesting 
that utilitarian principle could not, by itself, 
give any substantive result, that "rights theo-
rists" could not finally or usefully close all 
exits, that there was more to moral conver-
sion than to follow any single argument right 
to its end. I had been trained, after all, as a 
classical scholar and had already laid out the 
general form of my post-Aristotelian philoso-
phy for those who cared. What I aimed to 
produce was the possibility of a gestalt switch, 
a transformation of world-view, a genuinely 
realistic vision of the way things are for God, 
for the one and abiding pattern to which all 
things move. That animals were "morally 
considerable" was a necessary consequence of 
that vision of the world's beauty, a vision 
since described more lovingly by Erazim 
Kohak. 
Merely scholastic argument about "rights," 
I thought, got nowhere unless someone 
explained what was the point of having 
rights. Since then I have come to realize how 
tightly rights are tied to a particular "liberal" 
politics which are not mine. My early, and 
familial, socialism has gradually been trans-
formed into a vision of "shalom," a tradition-
al and even conservative understanding of 
human and other duty. I am by now a kind of 
anarcho-conservative - which is a common-
er position than some schoolmen realize. 
Utilitarian discussion I thought even less sen-
sible, a pretense of moral objectivity that 
never could in fact produce a single definite 
moral conclusion. Peter Singer and Raymond 
Frey agreed on almost every theoretical issue: 
why did they disagree in practice? Could 
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either give a genuinely informed calculation 
of the effect of action either way? Could even 
Tom Regan's wish to give all "subjects-of-a-
life" the very rights that American liberals 
have wished for human beings - a theory 
with which I had a lot more sympathy than 
he with mine - avoid scholasticism? Were 
not all these worthy and high-principled 
people simply concealing even from them-
selves what vision it was they served? Were 
any of us really quite so sure how a redeemed 
humanity might behave, in this real world? 
Granted that the "old" (or not so old) way of 
looking at the world, and animals, amounted 
to a refusal to face facts - a refusal of much 
the same kind that Iris Murdoch has identi-
fied as sin in personal relationships - what 
were the facts, how should we live at peace 
with what there was? 
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T seek to solve those problems, and prompted by a friendly publisher, I wrote The Nature of the Beast (1980; 
pbk. 1983), a deliberately simple study of 
what was involved in understanding animals 
- including, obviously, ourselves. Some 
critics assumed that it was yet another plea 
for "animal rights," instead of an account of 
what animals were, and how we might get 
onto friendly terms with them. It was also 
yet another attempt to show people what a 
moral argument should actually be like. No 
moral advice is ever convincing if it is 
offered merely as the conclusion of even a 
valid argument from previously accepted 
principles. The audience can always say (and 
will) that other principles. defeat the infer-
ence, that after all they will abandon those 
accepted principles, that even if the argu-
ment seems valid it must be less authorita-
tive than "what we already know." No 
sceptical argument, after all (or so we're 
often told), has greater weight than the sheer 
there-ness of consensus reality. The same 
must be true of any single moral argument. 
To change a moral vision all the world must 
be transformed: everything must support the 
new way, not just a cosy syllogism earnestly 
debated by ignorant schoolmen. Argument 
of the kind preferred by some philosophers is 
useless: there is nothing we can say strictly to 
refute a lunatic convinced that the world is 
against him, that he is the only really human 
consciousness, that animals are insentient or 
that there are no moral wrongs. Nothing, 
that is, that he will admit to be both true 
and destructively inconsistent with the 
theses he believes. As Chesterton (another 
author who had enormous influence on me) 
remarked, the lunatic is not cured when he is 
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"shown" to be inconsistent, but when a 
larger and brighter world breaks in on him. 
What was at stake for me was more than 
the fate of animals at our hands - though 
that was and remains a matter of my deep 
concern. What I had hated in "modem phi-
losophy" was the conceit that "we philoso-
phers" could sensibly debate and settle issues 
that had engrossed our moral and intellectual 
betters, without stepping outside the narrow 
confines of fashionable, academic philosophy, 
and without ever acknowledging any duty to 
reform, re-form our lives. Philosophy, said 
Descartes sardonically, "affords the means of 
discoursing with an appearance of truth on all 
matters and commands the admiration of the 
more simple." A resurrected Descartes might 
discover that such conceit had bred a violent 
contempt for such "philosophists" among the 
more politically and socially active. Why on 
earth should honest and dedicated people put 
up with being told they were, and always had 
been, talking nonsense by the sort of deliber-
ately unimaginative and ill-informed 
schoolmen who had claimed the garments of 
the Lady Philosophy? How can we claim to be 
true philosophers if we have no love of truth, 
nor any readiness to change our opinions and 
our ways? 
These questions absorbed me when I came 
to write Gifford lectures for Glasgow: what 
was the point of doing philosophy if it did not 
leave us better able to endure or to enjoy the 
world? The question was Epictetus's: in the 
past I had so disliked the attitude that Stoics 
(and Thomists) took to non-human animals 
that I had neglected the real virtues of that 
tradition - which was, after all, the very tra-
dition of moral and philosophical discourse in 
which I grounded myself. In From Athens w 
Jerusalem (l984), and now also in Limits and 
Renewals (a three volume work growing out of 
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the Stanton Lectures I am currently giving in 
Cambridge University), I seek to draw atten-
tion to the ancient way, the perennial philos-
ophy that always had the resources for a better 
and more truthful way with animals and with 
the biosphere. 
Our ten-year stay in Glasgow earned us 
many friends in the academy and in the 
church: for three years I was in training for 
the non-stipendiary priesthood of the Scot-
tish Episcopal Church. A change of rector in 
the local church, much more than a change 
of bishop, made the dream impossible to 
realize, but one event from that time was a 
crucial one. Attending a conference on 
charismatics as part of my training, I was 
"baptised in the Spirit." The experience itself 
- which did not occur amid scenes of mass 
enthusiasm, but alone in a quiet room with 
the baptising bishop - was an extraordinary 
one: a sense of being carried out of my depth, 
whirled round and remade. I returned home 
"drunk with the Spirit," in an exasperatingly 
good temper and deeply aware of the inner 
reality of those I met. That drunkenness 
passed in me, but from that time on (it was 
just before I gave the Giffords) I have seen 
more truth in old-fashioned religion than 
good liberal intellectuals usually allow. 
Perhaps I thereby acknowledged my commu-
nity with that non-conformist ancestry. 
It would be easy (and Simple-minded) to 
see providence at work in our next move, to 
Liverpool. "We are doing," we jokingly 
remarked, "a tour of decaying west-coast 
ports!" My second brother and his family 
already lived here; my parents had left Suffolk 
to join them here after my father's heart 
attack - an attack whose ill-effects were 
exacerbated by faulty drug treatment. Liver-
pool was also the home of one of the six 
British veterinary schools, and one that 
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seemed especially open to movement and 
radical enquiry. The Centre for the Study of 
Animal Affairs, recently established here with 
myself as director, is a network of psycholo-
gists, zoologists, philosophers and veterinary 
scientists who share the conviction that ques-
tions about the understanding and the treat-
ment of non-human animals are open to 
rational enquiry. 
Our move to Liverpool also, unexpectedly, 
added a third child to our family: "new house, 
new child," my mother had murmured irritat-
ingly. Suddenly we were thrown back a 
decade, to broken nights and children's 
stories, just as we thought that our twO older 
children were moving out into senior school 
life - attending the same kind of (indepen-
dent) schools that both of us had done. 
Somehow we both ke p teaching and 
researching; the Department of Philosophy at 
Liverpool is one of those to profit by the 
present troubles, by importing philosophers 
from elsewhere, and looks set to be estab-
lished as a north-western centre of the craft; 
somehow our children are clothed, fed and 
entertained. 
The post-Aristotelian, neo-Platonic syn-
thesis that I have been advocating now for 
nearly twenty years gets a better hearing 
nowadays. If Tom Regan is irritated (justly 
enough) by those who attribute the defence of 
"animal rights" to Peter Singer, I tOO am irri-
tated by claims that Tom is the "acknowl-
edged leader" of those who seek a better way 
for animals. It is "the argument," the Logos, 
that is our leader - not one simple syllogism 
or scholastic thesis, but the whole way of 
seeking to see things truly, without self.decep-
tion or greed, that is the ancient precondition 
of our being "in touch." Tr ating animals 
right, and treating arguments aright, cannot 
in the end be separated from the p rennial 
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task of living as God's friends and servants in 
the world He makes. That task is one we can 
accomplish only - if at all - by being ready 
to accept God's presence with us now: to 
accept God's presence, to be alive to it, is also 
to be alive to the reality of all the creatures 
with whom we share the world, and to seek 
His peace. 
With which high.minded proclamation, and 
sardonically aware how feebly, inconSistently 
and narrowly this creature here acts out the 
vision, I conclude my mid-term retrospective. 
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